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WASHINGTON

LAW REVIEW
VOLUM= VII.

FEBRUARY, 1932

NUmBER 1

RIPARIAN AND APPROPRIATION RIGHTS TO THE USE
OF WATER IN WASHINGTON

THE BACKGROUND
The Federal Government acqired undisputed title to the northwestern corner of the United States in the year 1846.' Except for
accrued rights2 this land became part of the public domain of the
United States for disposition by the Government through its Congress.3 When the Territory of Washington was created by the
Organic Act of March 2, 1853, it was expressly provided therein
that the legislative power of the Territorial Legislature should
extend to all rightful subjects of legislation not inconsistent with
the constitution and laws of the United States.4 Under the Constitution, the Federal Government had exclusive power to dispose
of the public domain;' and when the Territory of Washington
became a state in the year 1889, it was expressly declared in its constitution that the people inhabiting the State disclaimed all right
and title to the unappropriated public lands of the United States
lying within the state boundaries.6
1The federal government may acquire territory under its treaty making
power. Amer Ins. Co. v. Canter 1 Pet. 511 (1825). The United States government and England claimed this territory by right of discovery England
demanded that the Columbia
River be the boundary line. The United
States demanded "54 ° 40' or fight." Finally in the treaty concluded June
15, 1846 and proclaimed by the President August 5, 1846, 490 was agreed
upon. For earlier history, see Lownsdale vs. Parrsh,62 U. S. (21 How.)
293 (1859).
2 The fee title acquired is ordinarily subject to all bona fide grants to
individuals prior to the treaty of cession and to the right of occupancy
by Indians. Hence, a grant by the United States made before extinguishment of the Indian right remains subject thereto, but the title becomes
absolute in the grantee whenever the Indian right is extinguished. Clark
v. Smith, 13 Pet. 195 (1839) Beecher v. Wetherby, 95 U. S. 517 (1877)
I KINNEY ON IRR. AND WATER RIGHTS (2 ed.) §§402, 404, 405.
3 U. S. Const. Art. IV §3 Clause 2: "The Congress shall have the power
to dispose of and make all needful rules and regulations respecting the
territory or other property belonging to the United States;
" See
United States v. Fitzgerald, 15 Pet. 407 (1841).
' Rem. Comp. Stat. p. 23 §6.
Note 3, Supra.
0 Constit. of Wash. Art. XXVI, Art. I §2.
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The Federal Government disposed of its public domain in various
ways.7 It made grants of land for purposes of internal improvement. It granted a portion of its public lands for the use of public
schools to be established in states and territories. It granted land
for townsites. It disposed of land through the General Land Office
under preemption and homestead acts, under laws relating to public and private sales, under laws permitting issuance of military
land warrants and under the Desert Land Act of 1877 In addition
to land acquired from the Federal Government by individuals, both
the Territory and State of Washington received lavish grants for
school" and other purposes.'
The need for water in this state was destined to play a vital part
in the development of the law of water rights. While west of the
Cascade Range there was relatively little or no shortage of available
water, east of the Cascades the problem was serious. In many parts
water was scarce and much capital required to make it available
for use. Where, however, water was available in artesian basins,
streams or rivers,10 conflicts arose among competing users. Regrettable as those conflicts were, they did, however, cause the legislature and courts to regulate and pass upon claims made. In so doing,
the law of water rights was surely and necessarily developed.
TERRITORIAL LAW

The Territory of Washington could, subject to Federal law,
adopt any rule with respect to rights in water which it chose to
adopt. Except for Federal law, there were no constitutional or
common law limitations." Federal restrictions generally did, however, exist. Congressional legislation applicable since September 1,
1848, to the Territory of Oregon was continued in full force within
the Territory of Washington by the Organic Law of March 2, 1853.12
'

The methods are summarized in

I KINNEY ON IRE. AND WATER RIGHTS

(2 ed.) §408 et seq.

The Organic Act of 1853, sec. 20 (Rem. Comp. Stat. p. 21) set aside
sections 16 and 36 of each township for school purposes. It was further
provided that if such sections were occupied by actual settlers, the county
commissioners of the affected counties might locate other lands in equal
amounts in lieu of the occupied sections. These are the so called "indemnity school lands" See In Re Waters of Doan Creek, 125 Wash. 14, 215
Pac. 343 (1923). The Enabling Act of 1889 (Rem. Comp. Stat. p. 30) contained numerous grants for school purposes. See sections 10, 11, 13, 14, 16,
17, 18, 19. The State Constitution (1889) contained provisions safeguarding the lands granted. See Art. XVI and IX.
§12 granted land to aid the State in the erection
8 Enabling Act (1889)
of public buildings at the state capital. Section 15 granted land for erection of a penitentiary
SII KINNEY ON IRE. AND WATER RIGHTS (2 ed.) §2076, III FARNTJM ON
WATER AND WATER RIGHTS §653. An apt illustration of conflict is found in
Haberman et al. v. Sander et al., 66 Wash. Dec. 337 (1932).
1III FARNUX ON WATER AND WATER RIGHTS p. 2022 I KINNEY ON IRE.
8

AND WATER RIGHTS (2 ed.) §593, See WIEL ON WATER RIGHTS (2 ed.) Ch. II.
1 Org. Act of Terr. of Washington §12.

WATER RIGHTS
Aside from the Constitution, what was that law, so far as is here
relevant? When the Oregon Territory was established by Congress
on August 14, 1848, Indians, missionary stations, and British subjects were among those clainnig rights m that Territory In the
treaty between Great Britain and the United States in 1846, settling the boundaries of the northwest corner of the United States,
it was provided by Article Three thereof that the possessory rights
of the Hudson Bay Company and of all British subjects already in
occupation of land be respected.' The Act of Congress setting up
the Territory of Oregon not only preserved existing property rights
generally,34 but expressly safeguarded the rights of Indians and
missionary stations ;15 and in the Donation Land Act of September
27, 1850, making land grants to settlers of public lands in the
Territory of Oregon it was provided that those claiming rights
under the treaty with Great Britain relative to the Oregon Territory might elect to do so rather than to claim under the Act of

Congress.'6
These accrued rights under acts of Congress the territorial law
of Washington was compelled to respect. Thus far, however, there
was no specific legislation relating to water rights. There were other
Federal laws, however, affecting that subject. The Supreme Court
of the United States established the rule that the legal effect to be
given to a grant of land by the Federal Government within the
boundaries of a territory or state was to be determined by the law
of that territory or state in the absence of a reservation to the contrary'17 The Federal Government, although entitled to riparian
rights on its public lands, permitted local state or territorial law to
govern the question of water rights when such public lands passed
into private ownership.' 8 Nevertheless, the Federal Government
retained its paramount control over navigation.' 9 Accordingly, in
" This stipulation was early held not to constitute a grant to such sub-

jects Cowensa et al. v. Hannah et al., 3 Or. 465 (1869). Prior to Act of Con-

gress of Sept. 27, 1850 (9 Stat. at L. 496) there were no means of acquirmg title to land in "Oregon" effective against the United States. See
Lownsdale v. Parrssh,62 U. S. (21 How.) 293 (1858) reviewing the history
of the matter.
"'Actof August 14, 1848 (I LORD'S OREGON LAws p. 46).
' Sec. 14 of Act extended Ordinance of 1787 to Oregon; 9 Stat. 323 §14.
10Sess. L. of Washington 1854-56, p. 44, 45, I LORD'S OREGON LAWS, p. 48.
"'Hardenv. Shedd, 190 U. S. 508, 23 S. Ct. 685, 47 L. Ed. 1156 (1903)
Brewer, Elliott Oil & Gas Co. v. U. S., 260 U. S. 77, 43 S. Ct. 60; 67 L. Ed.
140 (1922) Bernot v. Morrtson, 81 Wash. 538, 143 Pac. 104 (1914) Hill v.
Newell, 86 Wash. 227 at p. 229, 149 Pac. 951 (1915) I KImY oN IRE. AND
WATER RIGHTS (2 ed.) §413 et seq., 447-449.
18 U. S. v. Rio GrandeDam etc. Co., 174 U. S. 690, 19 S. Ct. 770, 43 L. Ed.
1136 (1899) Gutierres v. Alhaquerque etc. Co., 188 U. S. 545, 23 S. Ct. 338,
47 L. Ed. 588 (1903) 1 KINNEY ON IR. AND WATER RIGHTS (2 ed.) §406,
See WIEL ON WATER RIGHTS (2 ed.) §32.
21 United States v. Rio Grande Dam etc. Co., note 18 supra. Hewitt-Lea
Lumber Co. v. King County, 113 Wash. 431, 194 Pac. 377 (1920).
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permitting local law to govern in those territories or states wherein
the doctrine of riparian rights had not been abolished, a grant of
land bordering upon or divided by a natural stream, carried with
it as an incident to the fee granted, the rights of a riparian owner
to the use of the water.20 So far as public lands in arid or semi-arid
regions were concerned, however, difficulties arose in the application of this doctrine of riparian rights. Land without water in such

regions was practically worthless. Again, the discovery of gold in
California necessitated the use of water to work mining claims.
Settlers began appropriating water on the public domain for agricultural and mining purposes on the basis of their needs rather
than on the basis of riparian rights. Indeed, only by permitting
such appropriation could the settlement of vast areas of the public
domain be encouraged. 21 To protect water appropriators on the
public domain against being disturbed in the enjoyment of their
water, Congress passed an act on July 26, 1866,22 making the national ownership of the public domain over and adjoining which
streams of water flowed, subject to the rights of appropriators of
water on such streams. 2 Hence, grantees of public lands took title
to such lands subject to the rights of prior water appropriators.
In the amendatory act of July 9, 1870, it was expressly provided,
"that all patents granted or preemptions of homesteads allowed,
shall be subject to any vested and accrued water rights
,,24The
doctrine of appropriation was carried still further by Congress in
20 Union Mill & M. Co. v. Ferris,Fed. cas. No. 14371, 2 Sawy 176 (1872)
Crandall v. Woods, 8 Cal. 136 (1857) Sturr v. Beck, 133 U. S. 541, 10 Sup.
Ct. 350, 33 L. Ed. 761 (1890) KINNEY ON IRR. AND WATER RIGHTS §188;
Where local law had abolished riparian rights, local law was enforced. Snake
Creek M. &T Co. v. Midway Irr Co., 260 U. S.596, 43 Sup. Ct. 215, 67 L. Ed.
423 (1923). See Hough v. Taylor 110 Wash. 361, 188 Pac. 458 (1920) involving riparian rights on Yakima Indian Reservation.
' II KINNEY ON IRR. AND WATER RIGHTS (2 ed) §805, I ibid. §611 et

seq., III

FARNUM ON WATER AND WATER RIGHTS,

p. 2017.

14 Stat. at L. 251, Comp. Stat. §4647. Sec. 9 provided.
"Wherever by priority of possession, rights to the use of water for
mining, agricultural, manufacturing, or other purposes, have
vested and accrued and the same are recognized and acknowledged
by the local customs, laws, and the decisions of courts, the possessors and owners of such vested rights shall be maintained and
protected in the same."
See 43 U. S. C. A. §661 et seq. See State ex rel. Olding v. Stampfly, 69
Wash. 368, 125 Pac. 148 (1912) applying statute to school lands followed in
In re Doan Creek, 125 Wash. 14, 215 Pac. 343 (1923), and In re Crab Creek
and. Moses Lake, 134 Wash. 7, 235 Pac. 37 (1925), overruling Colburn v.
Winchell, 97 Wash. 27, 165 Pac. 1078 (1917)
2 In Broder v. Natoma Water Co., 101 U. S.274, 25 L. Ed. 790 (1879)
it was held that rights of water appropriators on public domain which the
Government by its conduct had recognized and encouraged would be protected even without congressional legislation. In Isaacs v. Barber 10
Wash. 124, 38 Pac. 871 (1894) it was held that the Act protected appropriations of water made prior to the Act.
2, 16 Stat. at L. 217
Comp. St. §4648.
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the enactment of the Desert Land Act of March 3, 1877.25 In that
act, which was applicable to Pacific Coast states and territories,
and winch mnno way repealed the previous acts, the use of all unappropriated water upon desert lands m the public domain in nonnavigable beds of water was to be held free "for the appropriation
and use of the public for irrigation,26 inning and manufacturing
purposes, subject to existing rights."
The territorial law was bound not only to respect water rights
arising under these Federal statutes, it was also bound for a time to
respect such enactments of the Oregon Territorial Legislature as
were applicable to the Territory of Washington at the time that
the Organic Act went into effeet.27 So far as water rights were
concerned, however, neither the Territorial Legislature of Oregon 28
nor the Oregon Territorial Court29 had touched the matter in any
way whatsoever prior to 1856, when the Territorial Legislature of
19 Stat. at L. 377 Comp. Stat. §4674, 44 Cong., Sess. 2; Chap. 107. Sec.
1. After providing for the sale of desert lands in small tracts to persons
effecting reclamation thereof by an actual appropriation and use of water
the Act provided:
"All surplus water over and above such actual appropriation and
use, together with the water of all lakes, rivers and other sources
of water supply upon the public lands and not navigable, shall
remain and be held free for the appropriation and use of the public for irrigation, mining and manufacturing purposes, subject to
existing rights."
20 This Act was amended Mar. 3, 1891 (26 Stat. at L., 1096, 1097). This,
and subsequent amendments are discussed in III KINiE oN IRR. AND WATER
RIGHTS (2 ed.) 1912 §1290 et seq., LONG ON IRRIGATION (2 ed.) 1916 §305
et seq. For present law, see 43 U. S. C. A. §321 et seq. In Still 'v. Palouse
Irr & Power Co., 64 Wash. 606, 117 Pac. 466 (1911) and Bernot v. Morrsson,
81 Wash. 538, 143 Pac. 104 (1914), the court refused to follow Hough v.
Porter,51 Or. 318, 95 Pac. 732, 98 Pac. 1083, 102 Pac. 728 (1908), and held
that the Act applied only to desert lands and did not abrogate the law of
riparian rights. For other federal legislation, see 43 U. S. C. A. §371 et
seq. dealing with reclamation and irrigation of land by federal government; 16 U. S. C. A., sec. 791 containing the Federal Water Power Act.
State laws remain unaffected, 16 U. S. C. A., sec. 821, 43 U. S. C. A., sec. 383.
The Carey Act authorizing grants of desert land to states for reclamation
purposes is set out in 43 U. S. C. A. §641 et seq. Generally, see Title 43
of U. S. C. A. Federal "law is discussed in I KINNEY ON IRR. AND WATER
RIGHTS (2 ed. 1912), §416 et seq., 624 et seq., III ibid. §1235 et seq.,
§1309, et seq., §1312 et seq., WIEL ON WATER RIGHTS (2 ed.) p. 52.
As to water rights in forest reserves, see Brown v. Cle Elum, 143 Wash. 606,
255 Pac. 961 (1927) Utah P & L. Co. v. U. S., 243 U. S. 389, 37 S. Ct. 387,
61 L. Ed. 791 (1917).
"Note 12, supra.
In 1864, the Oregon Legislature passed an act permitting miners to
make local laws with respect to possession of water rights. See In re. Hood
River, 227 Pac. (Ore.) p. 1086 (1924). But this was after the Act of 1856
passed by the Territorial Legislature of Washington referred to in note
30 un!ra.
" The first Oregon case considering the doctrine of riparian rights
according to Hough v. Porter,98 Pac. (Ore.) p. 1099, was Taylor v. Welch,
6 Ore. 198 (1876). The leading case is Weiss v. Oregon Iron & Steel Co., 13
Or. 496, 11 Pac. 255 (1886).
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Washington abrogated the Oregon law then in force in the Washington territory and provided for the recognition of the common
law 30
Consequently, the Territory of Washington had a hand comparatively free from overriding legislation in determining what the
nature of water rights should be. The Territorial Court of Washington had no opportunity, however, to discuss the nature of water
rights existing in the Territory, for no case seems to have reached
the court involving water right questions. As for the Territorial
Legislature, little legislation of importance specifically concerned
with the nature and acquisition of water rights was enacted except
toward the last days of the Territory 3' Legislation protecting wells,
springs, and reservoirs from pollution,3 2 licensing ferries across
lakes or streams, giving abutting owners preference,3 3 permitting
building of wharves 34 and bridges,3 5 prohibiting the discharge of
ballast in navigable waters, 6 preventing and removing the obstruction of rivers, 37 changing the channel of a stream,3 8 authorizing the
creation of water companies, 39 40 indicates the character of legislation enacted. Nevertheless, interest in the beneficial use of water
was apparent. In 1873 an act regulating irrigation and water rights
in Yakima County was passed. 4 1 In 1875 an act authorizing the construction of ditches and water courses appeared - and in 1879
appropriation of water upon making due compensation was
authorized.

43

THE STATE LAW

So far as concerns the subsequent history of the matter, nothing
important was done until Washington became a state. The State
Constitution which went into effect in 1889 4 provided that "the use
3 Sess. L. 1855-6, p. 2, provided inter alia "That the common law, in all
civil cases, except where otherwise provided by law shall be in force."
, Sess. L. 1879, p. 124, 134, also ibid. '69 p. 340 §§ 30, 31, ibid. '73 p. 408,

§§ 28, 29 Code '81 §2448; ibid. '83, p. 45, §8.
1, Sess. L. 1854-56, p. 79, §25.
"Sess. L. 1854-56, p. 353, §3.
31Sess. L. 1854-56, p. 357, ibid. '60, p. 326, ibid. '63, p. 531, Code 1881,
§3271.
Sess. L. 1854-56, p. 361.
"Sess. L. '54, p. 94, ibid. '55, p. 34, ibid, '56, p. 11, ibid, '77, p. 285,
Code '81, §918.
11Sess. L. 1862, p. 301, Local and Private Laws, p. 61, also ibid. '54, p. 94,
Code 1881, §919; ibid. '88, p. 190; ibid. 1857-58, p. 85, ibid. '68, pp. 65 and 84.
38 Sess. L. '67, p. 215 (for stock and other purposes).
19Code 1881, p. 423.
0 See notes 41-43 infra.
I Sess. L. '73, p. 520.
4 Sess. L. 1875, p. 92; Code 1881, pp. 434-437.
" See note 31 supra.
"The Constitution was ratified by the people at an election held October 1, 1889, and the President of the United States proclaimed the admission of the State of Washington into the Union on November 11, 1889. See
Rem. Comp Stat., p. 41.
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of the waters of this state for irrigation, mining and manufacturing
purposes shall be deemed a public use. ' 45 In 1890 the State Legislature passed an act providing for the use of water for irrigation
purposes and providing for the condemnation of rights of way for
ditches to carry water for such purposes. 46 Section 1 provded
"Any person is entitled to take from any of the natural
streams or lakes in this state water for the purposes of irrigation, not heretofore appropriated or subject to rights
existing at the time of the adoption of the constitution of
this state, subject to the conditions and regulations imposed by law, Provided, That the use of Waters at all times
shall be deemed a public use and subject to condemnation
as may from time to time be provided for by the Legislature of this state." 47
In 1891 the Legislature passed an act concerning the appropriation of water for irrigation, mining and manufacturing purposes,
in which Section I provided.
"The right to the use of water in any lake, pond or
flowing spring in tins state, or the right to the use of water
flowing in any river, stream or ravine of this state, for
irrigation, mining or manufacturing purposes, or for supplying cities, towns or villages with water, or for waterworks, may be acquired by appropriation, and as between
appropriations the first in tine is first in right."
It was further provided by this act that water appropriation
rights might be the subject of sale and that appropriations made
prior to the act and water rights existing at the date of the passage
48
of the act should not be prejudiced.
THE CASE o BENTON vs. Jomncox
The effect of the foregoing legislation upon the doctrine of
riparian rights was not considered by the Supreme Court of Washmgton until the famous case of Benton vs. Johncox in 1897.4
Meanwhile the Legislature in 1891 had passed an act making the
common law applicable in Washington if not incompatible with
the institutions and condition of society in this state. 50 Again the
Supreme Court in a number of decisions beginning with Thorpe vs.
The Tenem Ditch Company5 in 1889 had considered the question
IsSee Rem. Comp. Stat., p. 120; Const. Art. I § 16, ibid. p. 49.
IsSess. L. 1889-90, p. 706. For other water right legislation see Sess.
L. '89-'90, pp. 652, 671, 729.
"Sec. 44 of this Act assumes the existence of riparian rights. See Sess.
L. '89-'90, p. 719.
ISess. L. 1891, p. 327. An illustration of appropriation under this act
is Grant Realty Co. v. Ham Yearsley & Ryne, 96 Wash. 616, 165 Pac. 495
(1917).
(1897). For subsequent history of Ahtanum
4' 17 Wash. 277, 49 Pac. 495
Creek, see In re Ahtanu Creek, 139 Wash. 84, 245 Pac. 758 (1926) State
ex rel. Cope v. Barnes, 158 Wash. 648, 291 Pac. 710 (1930).
Sess. L. 1891, p. 31. See note 30, supra.
01 Wash. 566, 20 Pac. 588 (1889).
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of rights in water. In those decisions, the rights of water appropriators on the public domain were examined and protected;"i
besides this, however, the court recognized5 3 and protected the
water rights of a riparian owner by granting injunctive relief and
by recognizing the right to recover at least nominal damages for
an interference with riparian rights. 4 In the Benton case the whole
subject of riparian rights was examined and the suitability of their
recognition in view of the needs of the State considered. After
examining authorities including most of the earlier Washington
cases, after citing the 1891 act establishing the common law as the
rule of decision in this state, and after rejecting the argument that
the water needs of Washington required a rejection of the riparian
right doctrine, the court protected the riparian rights of a grantee
from the Federal Government against a subsequent appropriator
of water. The court further held that nothing in the acts of 1873,
1890, and 1891 militated against the recognition of riparian rights.
The effect of the constitutional provision making the use of the
waters of the state for certain purposes a public use and the effect
of the Desert Land Act were not considered." When, however,
these matters were presented to the Supreme Court, it found nothing
in them that required a departure from its earlier view 5 6
THE DOCTRINE OF RIPARIAN RIGHTS

The doctrine of riparian rights to the use of water became a subject of further explanation in the cases that followed. It came to be
understood that the owner of lands abutting upon a non-navigable
body of water was entitled by virtue of his riparian rights to the
natural and accustomed flow of such water without unnecessary
Thorpe v. Tenem Ditch Co., 1 Wash. 566, 20 Pac. 588 (1889) Ellis v.
Pomeroy Impt. Co. 1 Wash. 572, 21 Pac. 27 (1889) Geddis v. Parrish, 1
Wash. 587, 21 Pac. 314 (1889)
Isaacs v. Barber 10 Wash. 124, 38 Pac. 871
(1894) Wold et al. v. May, 10 Wash. 157, 38 Pac. 875 (1894) The rule of
these cases has been consistently recognized. Seee In re Sinlaheken Creek,
162 Wash. 635, 299 Pac. 649 (1931).
53Crook v. Hewitt, 4 Wash. 749, 31 Pac. 28 (1892) Rigney v. Tacoma etc.
In Wintermute v. Tacoma L. & W
Co., 9 Wash. 576, 38 Pac. 147 (1894)
Co., 3 Wash. 727, injunction was denied. See note 117 snfra. Geddish v.
Parish,1 Wash. 587, 21 Pac. 314 (1889) appears to contain the earliest
discussion of riparian rights in this state although the rights were not
called riparian. See also Meyer v. Tacoma Lsght & Water Co., 8 Wash. 144,
35 Pac. 601 (1894), involving riparian right to underground water.
4 Shotwell v. Dodge, 8 Wash. 337, 36 Pac. 254 (1894) involved action
by riparian owner for damages resulting from diversion of water from a
stream.
5 See notes 25 and 45 supra.
51Still v. Palovse etc. Co., 64 Wash. 606, 117 Pac. 466 (1911) Bernot v.
See II KiNNEY ON IRR. AN-)
Morrison, 81 Wash. 538, 143 Pac. 104 (1914)
WATER RIGHTS: (2 ed.) §817.
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diminution57 or pollution.5 8 Such rights did not, however, extend
to navigable bodies of water as against the State or one claiming
under its appropriation laws.5 9 But where applicable, the upper
riparian owner was permitted to use all the water of a stream, if necessary, for domestic purposes, 1.e., culinary and household purposes, watering a garden, cleaning, washing, feeding, and supplying
the ordinary quantity of cattle.8 0 For other than domestic purposes,
such as irrigation and power, it was recognized that only a reasonable and beneficial use might be made.81 The amount of water that
would be reasonable would depend upon the circumstances varying
0 For cases prior to Benton v. Johncox, 17 Wash. 277, 49 Pac. 495 (1897),
see notes 52-54 supra. Subsequent cases include New Whateom v. Fazrhaven Land Co., 24 Wash. 493, 64 Pac. 735 (1901) Nesalhous v. Walker,
45 Wash. 621, 88 Pac. 1032 (1907), in which riparian rights regarded as
rule of property- Tacoma E. R. Co. v. Smithgall, 58 Wash. 445, 108 Pac.
1091 (1910) Mason 'v. Yearwood, 58 Wash. 276, 108 Pac. 608 (1910) Still
v. Palouse Irr & P Co., 64 Wash. 606, 117 Pac. 466 (1911) Miller 'v. Baker,
68 Wash. 19, 122 Pac. 604 (1912) Sandar v. Bull, 76 Wash. 1, 135 Pac. 489
(1913) State ex rel. Davns v. Supr Ct., 84 Wash. 252, 146 Pac. 609 (1915)
Domrese v. City of Roslyn, 101 Wash. 372, 172 Pac. 243 (1918) Hough v.
Taylor 110 Wash. 361, 188 Pac. 458 (1920) Smith v. Nechantcky, 123
Wash. 8, 211 Pa. 880 (1923). Any diversion though resulting in mere
nominal damage is a violation of riparian rights of lower owners. Rigney
v. Tacoma etc. Co., 9 Wash. 576, 38 Pac. 147 (1894) Mally v. Weidenstetner, 88 Wash. 398, 153 Pac. 342 (1915).
Tacoma Eastern R. Co. v. Smithgall, 58 Wash. 445, 108 Pac. 1091
(1910) Packwood v.Mendota Coal & Coke Co., 84 Wash. 47, 146 Pac. 163,
L. R. A. 1915 D. 911 (1915). Necessary pollution arising out of domestic
uses is permitted. McEvoy v. Taylor, 56 Wash. 357, 105 Pac. 851, 26 L. R. A.
(N. S.) 222 (1909).
61State ex rel. Ham etc. v. Supr. Ct., 70 Wash. 442, 126 Pac. 945 (1912)
Newell v. Loeb, 77 Wash. 182, 137 Pac. 811 (1913) see Port of Seattle v.
Ore. & W R. R. Co., 255 U. S. 56, 41 S. Ct. 237, 65 L. Ed. 500 (1921), in which
the Court said:
"The right of the United States in the navigable waters within
the several states is limited to the control thereof for purposes of
navigation. Subject to that right, Washington became upon its organization as a state, the owner of the navigable waters within its
boundaries and of the land under the same."
However, vested rights of a littoral owner upon a navigable lake to the
uninterrupted flow of water derived under a patent issued prior to the
adoption of the State Constitution, continues unimpaired. Madison v.
Spokane Valley Land & Water Co., 40 Wash. 414, 82 Pac. 718 (1905)
Hewitt-Lea Lumber Co. v. King County, 113 Wash. 431, 194 Pac. 377 (1920).
Wash. 558, 250 Pac. 41 (1926). cf.
C See Hunter v. Langenour 140
Hayward v. Mason, 54 Wash. 653, 104 Pac. 141 (1909).
See note 60, supra, Nesalhous v. Walker 45 Wash. 621, 88 Pao. 1032
(1907) Nelson . Spooner, 46 Wash. 14, 89 Pac. 155 (1907) Kalama Elec.
L-ght & P Co. v. Kalama Drnng Co., 48 Wash. 612, 94 Pac. 469 (1908)
held that the use of water for power purposes is a riparian use. It is also
a public use for eminent domain purposes. State ex rel. Chelan Co. v. Supr
Ct., 142 Wash. 270, 253 Pac. 115 (1927). In State ex rel. Kennewick Irr
Dtst. v. Supr Ct., 118 Wash. 517, 204 Pac. 1 (1922) it was held in a condemnation proceeding that the use of water for irrigation purposes was
superior to use for power purposes, and there was dicta to the effect that
domestic uses were superior to irrigation uses.
C See Hunter Land Co. v. Langenour 140 Wash. 558, 250 Pac. 41 (1926)
27 R. C. L. p. 1083.
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in each case.12 This riparian right was not a mere easement, but an
incident of the land itself-real property 63 As such real property,
it was severable, salable and condemnable.64 Though transferable, a
riparian right could not be sold so as to enable the purchaser to
use water on non-riparian land.66 The riparian owner did not own
the water itself-his was only the right to use-a usufruct in the
water.0 6 But beneficial use was no more required to preserve such
right than the use of any other real property was required to retain
ownership.6

Quite different, however, was the doctrine of appropriation as it
came to be applied under the water appropriation statutes. The
rights of the riparian owner to the use of water were co-equal. The
rights of the appropriator were successive-qui prior est qui prior
tempus est.6" The riparian owner had a mere usufruct in the water.
The appropriator had a conditional ownership in the water itselfan ownership that enabled him, if he so desired, to sell the water for
use on non-riparian land. 69 The riparian owner owned his water
right even though he made no beneficial use of the water whatsoever.
The appropriator, however, gained his right by diligent and beneficial user.70 The amount of water available to the riparian owner
depended on the circumstances including the need of other riparian
owners. The amount of water to which the appropriator was enCrook v. Hewitt,
Benton v. Johncox, 17 Wash. 277, 49 Pac. 495 (1897)
4 Wash. 749, 31 Pac. 28 (1892) Rigney v. Tacoma Light & Power Co., 9
Wash. 576, 38 Pac. 147 (1894) New Whatcont v. Fairhaven Land Co., 24
Wash. 493, 64 Pac. 735 (1901)
" See Rigney v. Tacoma Light & Water Co., 9 Wash. 576, 38 Pac. 147
(1894) Everett Water Co. v. Powers, 37 Wash. 143, 79 Pac. 617 (1905)
Northwestern Elec Co. v. Lyle Etc. Co., 71 Wash. 384, 128 Pac. 674 (1912)
Pleasant Valley Irr & P Co. v. Barker 98 Wash. 459, 167 Pac. 1092 (1917)

United Paper Board Co. v. Iroquois Etc. Co., 226 N. Y. 38, 123 N. E. 200

(1919). cf. Sess. L. of Wash. 1903, pp. 113, 116, recognizing water right as

purchaseable; Sess. L. of Wash. 1891, p. 327, Sec. 6, recognizing transferable
character of water appropriation right.
See Ann. 14 A. L. R.
The weight of authority supports this view
Kirkland
330 Rigney v. Tacoma Etc. Co. 9 Wash. 576, 38 Pac. 147 (1894)
v. Cochrane, 87 Wash. 528, 151 Pac. 1082 ( 1915) Van Dissel v. Holland Etc.
Co., 91 Wash 239, 157 Pac. 687 (1916) Madison v. Spokane Valley Etc. Co.,
40 Wash. 414, 82 Pac. 718 (1905) Longmtre v. Yakima Etc. Co. 95 Wash.
302, 163 Pac. 782 (1917).
1 Rigney v. Tacoma Etc. Co., 9 Wash. 576, 583, 38 Pac. 147 (1894)
67

See note 66 supra: "Use does not create, and disuse cannot destroy or

suspend it."

"Hunter Land Co. v. Langenour 140 Wash. 558, 250 Pac. 41 (1926) cf.
In re Icicle Creek, 159 Wash. 524, 294 Pac. 245 (1930). See Haberman et al.,
v. Sander et al., 66 Wash. Dec. 337, 345 (1932).
'DSee note 70 infra. In 19 Idaho 727, 115 Pac. 488, 490 appropriators
right was held to be real property See Dunsmruir v. Port Angeles Gas etc.
Co., 24 Wash. 104, 63 Pac. 1095 (1901) cf. Beetchanow v. Bartholet, 162
Wash. 119, 298 Pac. 335 (1931)
7oIn re Alpowa Creek, 129 Wash. 9, 224 Pac. 29 (1924) reviews the
authnrities.
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titled included his reasonable needs within a reasonable future time
71
irrespective of the needs of other appropriators. 72
THE LEGIsLATURE

While the doctrine of riparian rights was being elaborated, the
Legislature had been passing many statutes relating to the beneficial
use of water. The importance of the subject becomes at once apparent from even a cursory review of the principal statutes.
In 1890, it passed an act providing for the organization and government of irrigation districts, a subject which was subsequently
to prove a prolific source of legislation. 3 In 1899, it passed an act
providing for the condemnation and appropriation of water for
irrigation and mining purposes ;74 and another act designed to prevent pollution of city water supply 75 Two years later it passed an
act regulating the flow of water from artesian wells with a view
to conserving such water.7 6 Later, legislation creating river improvement districts was enacted. 7 In 1905, an act was passed providing
for the irrigation and improvement of lands granted to the State
of Washington ;78 and an act passed empowering the United States
government to acquire property and water rights in connection
with its reclamation of arid lands policy 79 In 1907, the legislature
passed a statute designed to regulate, distribute and measure stored
and flowing waters.8 0 Two years later, an act was passed for the
purpose of protecting structures used in utilizing water and making
it a crime to steal water from an irrigation ditch.8 ' In 1911 cities
were authorized to condemn water rights in aid of fire protection ;82
and to acquire water for irrigation uses.83 Acts were also passed per7Avery v. Johnson, 59 Wash. 332, 109 Pac. 1028 (1910). In re Crab
Creek and Moses Lake, 134 Wash. 7, 235 Pac. 37 (1925).
See, however,
Ortel v. Stone, 114 Wash. 500, 205 Pac. 1055 (1922).
72A discussion of riparian and appropriation water systems is contained in 28 Harv. L. R. 271, 36 H. ibid. 960; also, see Sander 'v. Bull, 76
Wash. 1, 135 Pac. 489 (1913).
Sess. L. '90, p. 671, ibid. '95, p. 433; ibid. '13, p. 558; ibid. '15, p. 605,
ibid. '17, p. 723; ibid. '19, p. 527 ibid. '21, p. 422; ibid. '23, p. 419; ibid. '25,
p. 6; ibid. '27, p. 373; ibid. '29, p. 478; ibid. '31, p. 187.
" Sess. L. 1899, p. 261. Constitutionally upheld in Weed v. Goodwtn, 36
Wash. 31, 78 Pac. 36 (1904)
75Sess. L. '99, p. 114 Am. L. '07, p. 562.

,8Sess.
ITSess.
Sess.
,Sess.

L. 1901, p. 259.
L. 1903, p. 270; also ibid. '07, p. 109; ibid. 19, p. 266.
L. '05, p. 113.
L. '05, p. 180; see note 26, supra.

Sess. L. '07, p. 285.
81Sess. L. '09, p. 721.
12Sess. L. 1911, p. 442.
3Sess. L. 1911, p. 510. Cities and towns were authorized to acquire and
construct public improvements involving the use of water as early as Sess.
L. '90, p. 520. As amended, the act is embodied in Rein. Comp. Stat. 1927,
Supp. §9488. P. C. §1214.
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mitting dams and irrigation works ;84 remedying defects in commercial water way distrits89 including those previously established ;86
and providing for the construction of public waterways in the interests of navigation. 7 In that year, a resolution was passed, authorizing the printing of a proposed water code."' In 1913, in addition to
making an appropriation for the Water Code Commission in connection with the drafting of the water code,"9 it authorized the establishment of districts to furnish water and power for uses other than
irrigation ;9" it passed an act relating to protection against stream
overflow ;91 and amended statutes permitting cities to construct and
operate public utilities in the utilization of water.92 In 1915, the
Legislature amended the water district 9 and irrigation district
acts,94 the latter acts being again amended in 1917 15
THE WATER CODE

The constant attention given by nearly every session of the state
legislature to water problems indicated clearly the importance that
the subject assumed in the minds of the legislators. However, the
provisions made by the legislature for the use of water were not
regarded as satisfactory 91 In order to safeguard the maximum use
of the water resources of the state, a water code based on the theory
of appropriation was passed in 1917 17 It was based in large measure
" Sess. L. 1911, p. 436.

" Sess. L. 1911, p. 11, cf. ibid. '09, Ex. Sess., p. 8.
,6Sess. L. 1911, p. 10.
Sess. L. 1911, p. 64.
Sess. L. 1911, p. 658.
Sess. L. '13, p. 672.
Sess. L. '13, p. 533.
Sess. L. '13, p. 156, See Sess. L. '21, p. 747.
92See note 83, supra.
93Sess. L. '15, p. 75.
" Sess. L. '15, p. 605. See note 74, supra.
Sess. L. '17, p. 723. See note 74, supra.
In West Side Irr Co. v. Chase, 115 Wash. 146, 196 Pac. 666 (1921), it
was said:

"It is well known that for many years much trouble arose over the
right to take water for irrigation and domestic purposes. There
were many private disputes and there was no adequate provision
of law whereby prior rights of appropriators could be easily and
satisfactorily settled and determined. From time to time the legislature of the state had enacted laws with a view of correcting the
condition thus existing, but they were more or less fragmentary
and did not fully meet the situation nor accomplish the purposes
desired. In 1917 the legislature passed the so-called water code,
which had been for years under consideration and which was
intended to cover the whole field of irrigation and correct the
abuses which had been inherent in earlier irrigation methods.
The code appears to be broad enough to include almost any conceivable right with reference to irrigation and to provide an inexpensive and ready manner of settling all disputes concerning
such matters."
"Sess. L. '17, pp. 447-468.
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upon prior legislation and the legislation of other states,98 and by
its terms it abrogated all prior statutes in conflict with the codeP9
including the Acts of 1890 and 1891.100 Section 1 provided
"The power of the state to regulate and control the
waters within the state shall be exercised as hereinafter in
this act provided. Subject to existing rights all waters
within the state belong to the public, and any right thereto,
or to the use thereof, shall be hereafter acquired only by
appropriation for a beneficial use and in the manner provided and not otherwise; and as between appropriations,
the first in time shall be the first in right. Nothing contained in tins act shall be construed to lessen, enlarge, or
modify the existing rights of any riparian owner, or any
existing right acquired by appropriation or otherwise.
They shall, however, be subject to condemnation as provided in Section 4 hereof, and the amount and priority
thereof may be determined by the procedure set out in Sections 14 to 26 inclusive thereof." 101
The State Hydraulic Engineer'0 - (and later the Supervisor of
Hydraulics)'" was made the administrative agency' by means of
which the Code was enforced. He was empowered to issue permits
for water appropriation' subject to right of appeal. 00 Provision
was also made to use his services in judicial proceedings to determine rights -towater. 07
The water code was amended in 1919,108 1921,109 1925110 and
0,See note 96 supra.
01Sess. L. '17, p. 468.
2 Ibid.
2 Appropriation under the 1917 Code is not exclusive. Hence an actual
prior appropriation under Laws of 1891 is superior to an appropriation
under the 1917 Code. In re Crab Creek and Moses Lake, 134 Wash. 7, 235
Pac. 37 (1925).
202
Sess. L. '17, p. 488, See. 5. Sec. 9 et seq. provides for assistance by
water masters.
"' Sess. L. '21, p. 68, abolished office of State Hydraulic Engineer, but
by Sess. L. '21, pp. 38, 39, his duties were taken over by Supervisor of
Hydraulics.
"'06West Side Irr COL v. Chase, 115 Wash. 146, 151, 196 Pac. 666 (1921)
Funk . Bartholet, 157 Wash. 584, 289 Pac. 1018 (1930). Under Sess. L. '07, p.
285, the duties of the water commissioner had been held administrative
and ministerial, not judicial. State ex rel. Bennett v. Taylor 54 Wash.
150, 102 Pac. 1029 (1909). See 38 Harv. L. R. 447. The decisions of the
Engineer and Supervisor of Hydraulics have been regarded with much
respect by the Supreme Court. See In re Crab Creek and Moses Lake, 134
Wash. 7, 235 Pac. 37 (1925) State ex rel. Gibson v. Supr Ct., 147 Wash.
520, 266 Pac. 198 (1928) In re Ahtanum Creek, 139 Wash. 84, 245 Pac.
758 (1926). The administration of the Code is protected by the criminal
law. See State v. Lawrence, 65 Wash., Dec. 426 (1931).
10 Sess. L. '17, see. 27 et seq.
Sess. L. '17, see. 11, Am. L. '19, Ch. 71 see. 1.
Sess. L. '17, see. 14 et seq.
1I Sess. L. '19, p. 141.
" Sess. L. '21, p. 303.
21 Sess. L. '25, Ex. Sess. p. 457.
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1929111-a period of fruitful legislation relating to the use of
water." 2
JUDICIAL POLICY OF BENEFICIAL USE OF WATER

During this period of legislative activity, it was becoming apparent
that the policy of efficient and beneficial use of water was expressing
itself clearly not only in legislation, but in decision. Invited to do
so, the Supreme Court refused to hold that riparian rights could not
be condemned under the Act of 1890 in furtherance of beneficial use.
The statute authorized condemnation of all water except that needed
by a riparian owner. The court defined the term "need" to include
water needed at the time of condemnation and for a reasonable future
time-two or three years."" In State ex rel South Fork etc. Co. v.
Superior Court"4 it was held in an en banc decision that a riparian
owner who intended to make beneficial use of water at some future
time could not prevent another from condemning such rights pursuant to a proposed scheme to make immediate use of the water for
power purposes. It was even held that a private owner of agricultural lands might condemn land for irrigation ditch purposes", and
condemn water" 6 to enable him to irrigate his own land.
Sess. L. '29, p. 269.
In 1919, the Legislature authorized the diversion of water across the
lines of a state reciprocating (Sess. L. '19, p 85) and provided for the dissolution of water user associations in certain cases (Sess. L. '19, p. 863see note 79 supra) In 1921 an act was passed relating to the distribution
of water for irrigation purposes. (Sess. L. '21, p. 313). In 1923, an amendment to the act was passed by which cities were authorized to condemn
public utilities, including water rights (Sess. L. '23, p. 570)
and an
amendment to the commercial waterway district act was likewise enacted
(Sess. L. '23, p. 97). In 1925, provision was made for the appointment of
stream patrolmen (Sess. L. '25, p. 460) In 1927, the Legislature passed the
Reclamation District Act (L. '27, p. 402) and specifically repealed a number of obsolete and other statutes relating to water (Sess. L. '27, pp. 26, 61,
46, 37, 100)
In 1929, statutes were passed amending the act regulating
the flow of water from artesian wells (Sess. L. '29, p. 356)
amending
the act relating to the appropriation of water for use in connection with
federal reclamation projects (Sess. L. '29, p. 133) validating water districts created under 1913 act and authorizing the establishment of water
districts under the new act (Sess. L. '29, p. 218)
In addition, it provided for an annual license fee from users of water for power development
purposes (Sess. L. '29, p. 205)
In 1931, provision was made to protect
water districts previously established (Sess. L. '31, p. 222) and to be
established (Sess. L. '31, p. 223). In that year, also, the people of this
State adopted the Power and Water District Act (Sess. L. '31, p. 1). For
irrigation statutes, see note 74 supra, and Sess L. '25, p. 193; also ibid. '97,
p. 207, and ibid. '99, p. 164.
" State ex rel. Liberty Lake Irr Co. v. Supr Ct., 47 Wash. 310, 91 Pac.
968 (1907)
The Court said:
"It is not to the state's interest that the water of a non-navigable
stream should be idle or going to waste because one of its citizens
unjustifiably neglects to avail himself thereof, while others
stand ready and willing, if permitted, to apply it to the irrigation
of their arid lands."
102 Wash. 460, 173 Pac. 192 (1918)
"
State ex rel. Galbraith v. Supr Ct., 59 Wash. 621, 110 Pac. 429 (1910).
"' State ex rel. Anderson v. Supr
Ct., 119 Wash. 406, 205 Pac. 1051
(1922).
"'
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There were other decisions disclosing the policy of highest beneficial use. In Northport Breunng Co. V. Perrot17 it was held that
one claiming riparian rights could not defend against a suit for
injunction by a water appropriator when he failed to allege that
he was making beneficial use of the water. 118 In Prescott Irr Co. v.
9
Flahers"2
it was pointed out that Benton v. Johncox did not involve
surplus or overflow waters from the channel of a stream. 20 It was
again held that water between high and low water mark of a navigable lake was subject to appropriation for irrigation purposes, nor
would a riparian owner, as such, have rights of appropriation in
navigable waters superior to anyone else who could make beneficial use.1 2' But appropriation, the cases held, to be effective had
to be diligently pursued. It was not to the state's interest to let
22
waters flow idly by 1

THE CASE o BROWN

V CHASE

In line with the policy of highest beneficial use, the Water Code
had adopted the theory of appropriation. It was under that Code
that the conception of riparian rights received a decided modification. "Existing rights" had been expressly saved from mutilation
when the act was passed. It was soon decided that the right of condemnation was not retroactively conferred by the Code 22 nor
would cases be affected by its provisions, jurisdiction of which had
24
attached prior thereto.
25
In 1923, the court decided the famous case of Brown v. Chase,'
a landmark in the Washington law of riparian rights.
In that
case, it was held that the Supervisor of Hydraulics properly
granted a water permit to an irrigation district to appropriate
625 second feet of water in the Wenatchee River, a non-navigable
stream, for irrigation purposes on non-riparian land. The trial

2' 22 Wash. 243 60 Pac. 403 (1900).
11 In Methow Cattle Company v. Williams, 64 Wash. 457, 117 Pac. 239
(1911) the court refused to restrain the use of water diverted from a
creek for irrigation purposes where riparian owner suffered no damage
from such diversion. cf. note 57, supra. In Wintermute v. Tacoma L. &
W Co., 3 Wash. 727, 29 Pac. 444 (1892), an injunction was denied where
it was not shown that abutting owners would suffer actual injury from
diversion of water.
119 20
Vash. 454, 55 Pac. 635 (1899) also, see Kalez v. Spokane Val.
Land etc. Co., 42 Wash. 43, 84 Pac. 395 (1906).
Ortel v. Stone, 119 Wash. 500, 205 Pac. 1055 (1922).
State ex rel. Ham, Yearsley etc. v. Supr Ct., 70 Wash. 442, 126 Pac.
945 (1912)
J See notes 68, 113 and 121, supra, also Nelson v. Spooner, 46 Wash 14,
89 Pac. 155, 123 Am. St. Rep. 910 (1907).
2= State ex rel. Mason County P Co. v. Supr Ct., 102 Wash. 291, 173 Pac.
19 (1918).
"' Pate v. Peterson, 107 Wash. 93, 180 Pac. 894 (1919).
22125 Wash. 542, 217 Pac. 23 (1923).
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126
had
court, relying upon the common law view of riparian rights,

held that such a permit could not be issued as against a protesting
riparian owner, even though there was ample water in the river to
satisfy his needs after the proposed appropriation. The Supreme
Court reversed the decision of the trial court after a discussion of
the authorities and announced a doctrine contrary to many earlier
12 7
but supported to some extent by
expressions on the subject,
1 8

earlier decisions. "

The court held

,". * * in consonance with the general needs and welfare of the state, especially in the arid and semi-arid regions, and in harmony with legislation upon the matter,
we are now prepared to declare, instead of the mere loose
and general expressions in some of our opinions that (1)
waters of non-navigable streams in excess of the amount

which can be beneficially used, either directly or prospectively, within a reasonable time, on, or in connection with

riparian lands, are subject to appropriation for use on nonriparian lands."
THE SUBSEQUENT HISTORY OF BROWN V. CHASE
The full significance of the new definition of riparian rights was
to be more clearly demonstrated in the cases that followed. By
the new definition, it became possible to argue that whereas the
appropriator gained his right to the use of water by diligently and
beneficially using the same, the riparian owner retained his right
to the use of water by diligently and beneficially using the same.
9
In other words, as suggested in In re Sinlahekmn Creek"1 non-user
"I The trial court stated the law as follows:

"The right of riparian flow covers the normal flow in flood stage
and low water. Being an incident of ownership inseparable from
the soil except by consent of the owner or by condemnation, use
cannot create nor disuse destroy any more than failure to improve
or cultivate the land would destroy the fee in the owner or subject
it to rights of third persons without the owner's consent except
as an adverse user might do so."
See In re Sinlahektm Creek, 162 Wash. 635, 299 Pac. 649 (1931)
'-s The opinion refers to some of these. Others are discussed s-upra.
This case involved a dispute
'- 162 Wash. 635, 299 Pac. 649 (1931)
concerning water rights between riparian owners and appropriators. The
majority opinion inclines to the view that non-user works a forfeiture
of riparian right. Tolman, C. J., dissenting from the departmental decision, said.
"In my judament, riparian rights are not governed by the law of
user, and cannot be lost by mere non-user. So far as the judgment
appealed from is sustainable upon the theory that water cannot
be beneficially used either now or in the future upon the riparian
lands, I concur, but I cannot as now advised, lend my assent to
the principle that mere non-user, of itself, is a forfeiture of the
natural riparian rights created and provided by nature."
In State v. American Fruit Growers 135 Wash. 156, 237 Pac. 498 (1925)
the court refused to award water to riparian owners for irrigation purposes
because of failure to prove present or prospective use of water for such
purposes.
See also note 126, supra, in which trial court view in Brown v. Chase
was rejected by Supreme Court. In appropriation cases, mere non-user
without intent to abandon does not work a forfeiture. Sander v. Bull, 76
Wash. 1, 135 Pac. 489 (1913).
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worked a forfeiture.
In Proctorv. Sire1 0 the court expressly refused to depart from
Brown -v. Chase and held that surplus waters in a non-navigable
lake might be appropriated under the Water Code for use on nonriparian lands, even though the bed and banks were owned by one
riparian owner. The "existing rights" saved by the water code
were rights as defined m Brown v. Chase."'3
In State v. Amercan Fruit Growers' 2 the court again refused
to depart from Brown v. Chase and affirmed a decree refusing to
award riparian owners water for agricultural purposes because
such owners failed to prove a present or prospective use of water
for such purposes. The court said. "In other words, the riparian
owner, before he has any rights to protest, must with reasonable
certainty, show that either at present or within the near future, he
will make use of the water for irrigation purposes."
The court further held that a showing of fitness for use of water
is not enough. There must be a showing of intention to make beneficial use.
Hunter v. Langenour" continued to apply the rule of Brown v.
Chase. It discussed riparian and appropriation rights and held
that water might be appropriated under the Code for use on nonriparian land even against the objection of a riparian owner where
the water appropriated was in excess of the amount that could be
beneficially used by the riparian owner, i. e., surplus water.
The doctrine of Brown v. Chase and the cases that followed it
raised two important questions. The first question was whether
water in excess of present and prospective need, 1. e., surplus water,
could be appropriated under the Code without compensating the
riparian owner. In Funk v. Bartkolet"I it was held that the issuance of a water permit by the Supervisor of Hydraulics was not an
adjudication of private rights, being effective only against the State.
In fact, in Eikenbary v. Calispel LIght & Power Co."'5 it was held
that the recovery of damages for wrongful diversion of waters was
210134 Wash. 606, 236 Pac. 114 (1925)

m Cf. statutory definition of rights saved by the Oregon Water Code
set out in In re Hood River, 227 Pac. 1065, 1089 (1924).
"Actual application of water to beneficial use prior to the passage
of this act by or under authority of any riparian proprietor, or
by or under authority of his or its predecessors in interest shall be
deemed to create in such riparian proprietor a vested right to the

extent of the actual application to beneficial use."

This definition was held constitutional in In re Hood River, supra. See
40 Harv. L. Rev. 1023.
'1135 Wash. 156, 237 Pac. 498 (1925).
140 Wash. 558, 250 Pac. 41 (1926).
"157 Wash. 584, 289 Pac. 1018 (1930).
132 Wash. 255, 231 Pac. 946 (1925).
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not precluded by the issuance of a permit under the Water Code.
Whether the riparian owner was making beneficial use of water
does not clearly appear. In the case of In ?1e Martha Lake3 0 it was
likewise held that the Supervisor of Hydraulics could not issue a
permit to appropriate water of a non-navigable lake to the substantial injury of riparian owners making beneficial use of the water
without acquiring the right to appropriate by condemnation.' 7
Yet in Proctorv. SiM 3 8 the court refused to allow damages in trespass against one who appropriated surplus water of a non-navigable
lake.
The right to appropriate surplus waters given by the Water Code
coupled with the definition of "surplus water" given in Brown v.
Chase and cases following it, leads to the conclusion that no compensation need be made by a water appropriator of surplus waterscompensation being required only when riparian rights as defined
in Brown v. Chase are invaded by adverse appropriation. 91
The second question raised was far more difficult-and has not
yet been answered. The question was this From what date is the
prospective use to begin to run in determining the existence or
quantum of riparian right 9
In appropriation cases the answer was not difficult. Prior to
the Water Code, it was generally held that future needs might be
calculated from the time that steps were taken to ultimately use a
given quantity of water. 40 Under the 1917 code, it was provided
that the right acquired by appropriation relates back to the date of
filing the original application for a permit in the office of the
141
Supervisor of Hydraulics.
What, however, could the test be in cases of riparian rights 9 To
apply the measure of Brown v. Chase to riparian rights when they
first came into private ownership from the federal or state government would obviously work hardship on those who acquired those
rights in the beginning or through subsequent owners on faith of
the common law conception. And if the doctrine of forfeiture by
non-user 142 suggested since Brown v. Chase were strictly applied,
it would work great havoc with those riparian owners who had made
no use or limited use or late use of their rights.
1 152 Wash. 53, 277 Pac. 382 (1929)

1 See case of Domrese v. Roslyn, 101 Wash. 372, 172 Pac. 243 (1918)
holding same view prior to Brown v. Chase; also, Wintermute v. Tacoma
L. & W o. 3 Wash. 727, 731, 29 Pac. 444 (1892).
Note 130, supra.
13 See note 137, supra.
"' Hunter Land Co. v. Langenour 140 Wash. 558, 250 Pac. 41 (1926).
Sumner Lumber & Shingle Co. v. Pac. Coast Power Co., 72 Wash. 631, 131
Pac. 220 (1913)
"' Sess. L. '17, p. 463, sec. 35.
"' See note 129, supra.
"I
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On the other hand, to follow the analogy of appropriation, and
make the date begin to run from the date that beneficial user was
commenced, or from the date that someone else desired to make
beneficial use of water by appropriation or by resort to condemnation proceedings or by action of trespass or for injunction would
make the existence and quantum of riparian right dependent on
the uncertainties of need and on the chance that litigation would
be started.
In this condition of uncertainty legislation is needed to define
riparian rights and to determine the date from which prospective
use is to begin to run. Such legislation, combining the definition
of the Oregon Water Code1 43 with that of Brown v. Chase might
well provide that the surplus water subject to appropriation under
the Water Code is all unappropriated water except such as has
been actually applied to beneficial use prior to the passage of the
new act together with the reasonable needs of riparian owners for
a period of three years thereafter. Such an act would seem to be a
legitimate exercise of police power. 144
Other problems undoubtedly await solution when the time comes
to require their solution. Meanwhile, however, the history of water
right legislation and decision has unquestionably established the
principle that that solution will be adopted which most nearly conforms to the needs of the state in the beneficial use of water. Benton
v. Johneox rejected the sociologwal and accepted the logscal solution of the water right question. Brown v. Chase and cases which
have since followed it have decidedly reversed the emphasis. The
common law which met the needs of the humid country came to be
regarded in the course of its judicial history in Washington as "incompatible with the institutions and condition of society in this
state." That the history of water rights has not yet reached its
final chapter is obvious, and one may safely predict that an interesting story lies before us.145
Cn.ARLxs HoRowiTz*
113See note 131, supra.
2" See 40 Harv. L. Rev. 1023.
2,5 The argument m favor of appropriation doctrine is forcibly set out in
I KINNEY ON IB. AND WATER RIGHTS (2 ed. 1912), Sec. 594; see, also,
"Theories of Water Law," 27 Harv L. R. 580.
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